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The	 number	 of	 Islamic-based	
parties	has	dwindled	since	 the	beginning	
of	 post-Suharto	 era.	 From	 around	 42	
parties	ahead	of	the	1999	election	to	only	
five	 parties	 in	 the	 2019	 election.	 They	
include	 PPP,	 PAN,	 PKB,	 PKS,	 and	 PBB.	
However,	 although	 the	 government	 had	
stipulated	 the	 election	 law	 in	 2017	 that	
raised	the	electoral	threshold	by	4	percent,	
the	 new	 Islamic-based	 parties	 still	
emerged.	They	are	Partai	Ummat	(Ummah	
Party),	Partai	Masyumi	(Masyumi-Reborn	
Party),	 and	 Partai	 Gelora	 (Gelora	 Party).	
This	article	tries	to	explain	the	emergence	
of	 those	parties	 in	 relation	 to	 intra-party	
conflicts	and	political	fragmentation.	
The	limited	participation	of	Islamic	
parties	 in	 Indonesia’s	 democracy	 have	
been	a	concern	of	many	social	and	political	
scientists.	 Some	 of	 them	 explaining	 it	 by	
using	 the	 conflict	 perspectives.	 Mashad	
(2008),	 for	 example,	 demonstrated	 that	
the	fragmentation	of	Islamic	parties	in	the	
post-reform	 era	 was	 induced	 by	 the	
fragility	 of	 its	 organizational	 solidity.	
Internal	conflict	is	inevitable	as	a	result	of	
the	contradictory	views	and	interests	that	
occurred	 among	 the	party	 elites,	 and	 the	
disillusioned	elites	urge	you	 to	 leave	and	
form	 new	 parties.	 Noor	 (2016),	 who	
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scrutinized	 the	 PPP	 internal	 conflict	 in	
2014,	 revealed	 that	 the	 leadership	
weakness	 and	 the	 strong	 elites’	 interest	
have	 a	 role	 in	 creating	 the	 intra-party	
conflict.	Those	studies	seem	to	agree	that	
the	 inner	 conflict	 and	 fragmentation	 has	
degraded	 the	 Islamic-based	 parties’	
electoral	performance.		
The	 frequent	 intra-party	 conflict	
that	 leads	 to	 fragmentation	 indicates	 the	
weak	institutionalization	of	Islamic-based	
parties.	Ufen	(2006)	stated	that	the	parties	
in	 Indonesia	 were	 not	 supported	 by	
reliable	 organizational	 management	 so	
that	the	parties	were	highly	dependent	on	
government	 incentives.	 On	 this	 matter,	
Slater	 (2004)	 also	 expressed	 a	 similar	
view,	 that	 parties	 in	 Indonesia,	 including	
Islamic	 parties,	 tend	 to	 build	 pragmatic	
cooperation	 and	 coalitions	 to	 ensure	
access	 to	 various	 state	 resources.	 Such	 a	
condition	 has	 increase	 the	 tension	 of	
competition	among	party	elites	in	fulfilling	
their	political	ambitions.	
Other	 scholars	 emphasized	 the	
weak	 organizational	 performance	 and	
program	behind	the	limitedness	of	Islamic	
parties.	Such	as	Pepinsky,	Liddle,	&	Mujani	
(2012)	explained	 that	 the	 Islamic	parties	
were	hard	to	compete	with	the	nationalist	
parties	as	the	later	have	a	clearer	platform	









post-reform	 Indonesia	 have	 never	
exceeded	33.75	percent	in	aggregate.	
Other	 researchers	 explain	 the	
failure	 of	 Islamic	 parties	 to	 dominate	
Indonesian	 politics	 from	 socio-political	
cleavage	 or	 aliran	 (stream).	 Menchik	
(2006)	 and	 King	 (2000)	 stated	 that	
Indonesian	Muslims	are	politically	difficult	
to	unite	because	they	comprise	divergent	
entities.	 Cultural	 division	 within	 the	
Muslim	 group	 are	 also	 diverse,	 including	
their	political	views.	Not	all	Muslim	voters	
are	comfortable	with	Islamic	parties.	Some	
make	 it	 a	 political	 ideology,	 and	 some	
think	there	is	no	need	to	insert	religion	in	
political	 matter.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
political	 ideology	 of	 political	 parties	 in	
Indonesia	 does	 not	 adhere	 to	 a	 strict	
secular-religious	 dichotomy.	 Nationalist	
parties	 are	 also	 accommodative	 to	 the	
issues	 or	 interests	 of	 Islamic	 groups.	 In	
some	nationalist	parties,	there	are	organs	
carry	 out	 religious	 functions,	 such	 as	 the	
Baitul	Muslimin	Indonesia	in	the	PDIP	and	
the	 Majelis	 Zikir	 (Zikr	 Council)	 in	 the	
Democrat	 Party.	 Likewise,	 many	 of	
politicians	 came	 from	 Islamic	
organizations	in	the	nationalist	party.	This	
situation	burden	the	Islamic-based	parties	
in	 strengthening	 their	 positioning	 as	 a	
major	representation	for	Muslim	voters.	
Of	 the	 many	 studies	 on	 the	
dynamics	 of	 Islamic	 parties	 in	 Indonesia,	
they	 generally	 explain	 the	 limitedness	 of	




continue	 to	 emerge	 during	 increasingly	
fierce	electoral	competition.	In	this	regard,	
this	 article	 analyzes	 the	 establishment	 of	
new	 Islamic-based	parties	after	 the	2019	
election:	 Ummah	 Party,	 the	 Masyumi-
Reborn	Party,	and	the	Gelora	Party.	Two	of	
the	 three	 parties,	 namely	 the	 Ummah	






Party	 and	 the	 Masyumi-Reborn	 Party,	
carried	 Islam	 as	 their	 party's	 ideology.	
Meanwhile,	the	Gelora	Party	does	not	use	
Islam	 as	 formal	 ideology.	 However,	 the	
party	cannot	be	overlooked	from	a	robust	
Islamic	 narrative.	 For	 example,	 their	






variations,	 the	 Islamic-based	 parties	 in	
this	 article	 are	 determined	 not	 only	 on	
party’s	 ideology	 but	 also	 on	 its	 Islamic	
base,	 activists	or	politicians,	 and	political	
narratives.	
The	 emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic-
based	 parties	 after	 the	 2019	 elections	 is	
unprecedented,	 as	 they	 emerge	 under	 a	
political	 system	 designed	 to	 limit	 the	
number	 of	 political	 parties.	 Ahead	 of	 the	
2019	 election,	 the	 government	 and	 the	
legislature	had	stipulated	Law	no.	7/2017,	





5	 percent	 (Bayhaqi,	 2021).	 This	 means	
that	 minor	 parties	 and	 new	 parties	 will	
find	it	hard	to	place	their	representatives	
in	 the	 DPR.	 In	 addition,	 the	 new	 parties	
had	 to	 compete	 with	 the	 much	 more	
existing/established	parties.	
However,	 the	 parliamentary	
threshold	 and	 tighter	 electoral	
competition	did	not	prevent	the	formation	
of	 new	 Islamic-based	 parties.	 They	
emerged	with	 the	main	actors	who	came	
from	 prior	 parties,	 such	 as	 Amin	 Rais	
(Ummah	 Party),	 Ahmad	 Yani	 (Masyumi-
Reborn	 Party),	 and	 Anis	 Matta	 (Gelora	
Party).	 Accordingly,	 this	 article	 tries	 to	
answer	 why	 new	 Islamic-based	 parties	
emerged	 after	 2019?	 What	 factors	
prompted	 the	 establishment	 of	 these	
parties?	 By	 explaining	 the	 causes	 of	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic	 parties,	 this	
article	 is	 expected	 to	 enrich	 the	
understanding	 of	 the	 characteristics	 and	
dynamics	 of	 Islamic-based	 parties	 in	
Indonesia.	
This	 paper	 relies	 on	 a	 theoretical	
explanation	 of	 intra-party	 conflict	 and	
path-dependency	 to	 project	 the	
phenomenon	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	
Islamic-based	parties.	Intra-party	conflicts	
are	 commonplace	 in	 political	 parties	
because	 parties	 are	 organizations	 that	
consist	 of	 diverse	 individuals.	Due	 to	 the	
various	compositions,	conflicts	often	occur	
between	 party	 units,	 for	 example,	 as	
cadres	 were	 dissatisfied	 with	 central	
policies,	 disagreement	 over	 party	
platforms,	and	disputes	over	the	selection	
of	party	management	(Gherghina,	Close,	&	
Kopecký,	 2019).	 Meanwhile,	 Nurdin,	
Saputra,	 &	 Prayitno	 (2019),	who	 studied	
the	PPP	and	PKS,	 exposed	 that	 the	 intra-
party	conflict	also	could	be	stimulated	by	
the	differences	between	its	elites	support	
of	 national	 political	 contests.	 Examining	
PKS's	 internal	 conflicts	 in	 2016,	 Akmar	
(2019)	 showed	 that	 ideological	
differences	 drove	 internal	 conflicts.	 The	
diversity	 within	 the	 party	 also	 causes	
differences	 in	 policy	 preferences,	 both	 in	
terms	 of	 internal-party	 and	 government	
policies.	 At	 a	 certain	 level,	 these	
discrepancies	also	trigger	competition	and	
conflict	 among	 cadres	who	have	 political	
ambitions	(Ceron,	2016).	
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This	 article	 uses	 path-dependency	
analysis	due	 to	 the	 continuity	of	political	
fragmentation	patterns	driven	by	conflict	
between	 party	 elites.	 This	 perspective	
views	that	the	outcomes	or	circumstances	
that	 take	 place	 in	 an	 organization	 have	
paths	 of	 dependency	 on	 previous	
processes,	 routines,	 and	 practices		
(Braithwaite,	 2020).	 Based	 on	 the	
explanation	 of	 path-dependency,	 this	
article	argues	 that	 the	emergence	of	new	
Islamic-based	 parties	 after	 the	 2019	
election	 is	 an	 implication	 impelled	 by	
processes,	 routines,	 and	 practices	 that	
have	 occurred	 in	 the	 previous	 political	
events.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 flow	 of	 the	
explanation,	 this	 article	 looks	 at	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic-based	 parties	
related	to	the	conflicts	in	the	parties	where	
its	actors	took	part	in	their	former	parties.	
Such	 as	 the	 Ummah	 Party,	 which	 is	
associated	with	PAN,	the	Masyumi-Reborn	
Party	with	 the	PBB,	and	 the	Gelora	Party	
with	 PKS.	 In	 understanding	 intra-party	
conflicts	that	lead	to	the	emergence	of	new	
Islamic-based	 parties,	 this	 research	 also	
scrutinizes	 the	 external	 context,	 namely	




This	 research	was	 built	 through	 a	
qualitative	 method	 using	 a	 path	
dependency	 approach.	 This	 approach	
builds	 on	 the	 political	 science	 tradition	
that	 takes	 the	 historical	 institutionalist	
context.	 This	 approach	 aligns	 with	 the	
theory	 that	 views	unexpected	 changes	 in	
institutional	 aspects	 as	 the	 actors	 make	
inappropriate	 decisions	 that	 eventually	
hindering	 progress	 (Greener,	 2005).	 The	
study	 exercised	 on-desk	 research,	
collecting	 data	 from	 the	 Internet	 that	
informed	 the	 events	 and	 parties’	 actors	
statements	 relating	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	
Ummah	 Party,	 Masyumi-Reborn	 Party,	
and	Gelora	Party.	We	scrutinized	relevant	









reporting	 reputations,	 such	 as	 Tempo.co,	
Detik.com,	 Merdeka.com,	 and	
Kompas.com.	The	analysis	focused	on	both	
the	 narratives	 and	 statements	 of	 the	
parties	 actors	 relating	 to	 its	 intra-party	
conflicts	before	the	2014	election	to	2019	
election.	 In	 addition,	 the	 narrative	 or	
discourse	 of	 the	 opposition	 of	 activist	
groups	 against	 the	 Jokowi’s	 government	
was	also	examined	as	part	explanation	of	
the	 emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic-based	




Roots	 of	 Islamic-based	 Intra-party	
Conflict	and	Fragmentation	
The	discussion	of	this	article	starts	
from	 the	 historical-institutional	 tracking	
of	Islamic-based	political	parties	based	on	




have	 started	 since	 post-independence.	 In	
1952,	there	was	an	internal	conflict	within	
the	 Masyumi	 Party	 due	 to	 the	
disappointment	of	the	NU	group	over	the	
lack	of	strategic	positions	they	had.	The	NU	
group	 then	 left	 the	 Masyumi	 Party	 and	






founded	 the	NU	Party.	 In	 the	New	Order	
era,	 the	PPP,	which	was	 formed	 in	1973,	
also	 often	 experienced	 internal	 conflicts	
caused	 by	 government	 intervention	 that	
removed	 specific	 figures	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
regime	stability.	Clashes	also	occurred	due	
to	 differences	 in	 political	 views	 and	
attitudes	of	party	elites	towards	the	ruling	
government,	 until	 some	 NU	 figures	 left	
PPP	with	the	slogan	"return	to	khittah"	in	
1984	 as	 a	 critical	 step	 against	 Suharto	
(Budiarti,	2016).		
After	 the	 1999	 elections,	 Islamic	
parties	 emerged	 because	 political	
openness	 after	 the	 1998	 reformation	
encouraged	 Islamic	 figures	 to	 actualize	
their	 political	 views	 through	 elections.	
With	diverse	sociological	backgrounds,	the	
parties	 formed	 also	 varied	 according	 to	
their	 social	 bases	 and	 theological	 views.	
Around	 42	 parties	 out	 of	 the	 148	 newly	
formed	 parties	 were	 classified	 as	 Islam-
based.	 However,	 only	 20	 Islam-based	
parties	 passed	 the	 verification	 in	 the	
election.	 The	 spirit	 of	 establishing	 a	 new	
Islamic	 party	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	
historical	 orientation,	 in	 which	 Islamic	
parties	 had	 achieved	 significant	 electoral	
achievements	 in	 1955.	 Assuming	 the	
majority	 of	 Islamic	 voters	 in	 Indonesia,	
Islamic	leaders	perceive	this	condition	as	a	
political	 opportunity	 in	 realizing	 Islamic-
based	political	ideas	(Romli,	2004).		
However,	after	the	1999	elections,	
conflicts	 between	 Islamic-based	 parties	
began	to	appear	in	PPP.	In	2002,	Hamzah	
Haz's	camp	conflicted	with	Zainudin	MZ's	




when	 Matori	 Abdul	 Djalil	 committed	
'disobedience'	 by	 attending	 the	 MPR	
Special	Session	in	2001,	which	impeached	
Abdurrahman	 Wahid	 (Gus	 Dur)	 and	
supported	Megawati	as	president.	Matori	
was	later	appointed	as	Minister	of	Defense	
in	 the	 Gotong	 Royong	 Cabinet	 (2001-
2004).	 The	 PKB	 then	 split	 between	 the	
Alwi	 Shihab	 camp	 supported	 by	Gus	Dur	
(PKB	 Kuningan)	 and	 the	 Matori	 camp	
(PKB	 Batutulis).	 Matori	 then	 founded	 a	




(PII)	 and	 the	 Indonesian	 Al-Islam	 Party	
(PAS)	(Kamarudin,	2013).		
After	the	2004	elections,	PKB	again	
experienced	 internal	 conflicts.	 This	 time,	
Gus	Dur	 fired	Alwi	 Shihab	 and	Syaifullah	
Yusuf	 from	the	party	board	because	 they	
were	 appointed	 as	 ministers	 in	 the	
government	 of	 Susilo	 Bambang	
Yudhoyono	 (SBY)	 without	 Gus	 Dur's	
approval.	Alwi	Shihab's	camp	had	put	up	a	
fight	 by	 mobilizing	 kyai	 langitan	 and	
holding	 a	 counter-party	 meeting	 in	
Surabaya.	Gus	Dur's	camp	finally	won	the	
dispute	and	placed	Muhaimin	Iskandar	as	
general	 chairman	 in	 2005.	 However,	 in	
2008	battle	occurred	again	in	the	PKB	elite	
circle	 involving	 Gus	 Dur	 and	 Muhaimin	
Iskandar.	 The	 party	 was	 again	 divided	
because	 the	 two	 camps	 held	 an	
Extraordinary	 Congress	 (MLB),	 namely	
the	Gus	Dur	 camp	 (PKB	Parung)	 and	 the	
Muhaimin	 Iskandar	 camp	 (PKB	 Ancol).	
Muhaimin	 later	 won	 the	 party	 dispute	
(Kamarudin,	 2013).	 The	 prolonged	
conflict	 within	 the	 PKB	 prompted	 the	
establishment	 of	 new	 parties.	 In	 2007,	 a	
group	of	kyai	founded	the	Nahdlatul	Ulama	
Awakening	 Party	 (PKNU).	 Meanwhile,	
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Journal	of	Governance	Volume	6,	Issue	2,		December		2021	
 
        
 306 
Yenni	 Wahid	 registered	 the	 Indonesian	
National	 Sovereignty	 Party	 (PKBI)	 to	
participate	in	the	2009	election.	
In	 2006,	 internal	 party	 conflicts	
also	 rocked	 PAN.	 In	 line	 with	 the	
increasing	 openness	 of	 PAN,	 including	 in	
party	recruitment	and	management,	some	
cadres	from	Muhammadiyah	circles	were	
disappointed	 because	 they	 felt	
marginalized.	 The	 group	 then	 decided	 to	
form	 a	 new	 political	 party	 called	 the	
Matahari	Bangsa	Party	(PMB)	with	Islamic	
principles.	 The	nuanced	 factional	 conflict	
can	be	seen	from	their	claim	that	the	party	
was	 born	 from	Muhammadiyah	 ideology	
that	 PAN	 did	 not	 absorb	 (Detik.com,	
2006).	However,	 PMB	 then	 faded	 after	 it	
failed	 to	 gain	 enough	 votes	 in	 the	 2009	
election.	During	this	period,	PKS	was	also	





that	 were	 increasingly	 open	 and	 its	
militancy	 decreased.	 They	 then	 formed	
‘PKS	Watch’	 to	sound	their	critical	views.	





After	 the	 2009	 election,	 conflicts	
within	 the	 PKS	 became	 increasingly	
noticeable.	 In	 2013,	 the	 PKS	 executive	
leader,	 Luthfi	 Hasan	 Ishaq	 (LHI),	 was	
arrested	 by	 the	 KPK	 for	 a	 bribery.	 The	
incident	 ignited	 the	 anger	 of	 the	 cadres	
over	 the	 pragmatic	 leaning	 of	 the	 party	




board.	 Anis	 Matta's	 group,	 which	 was	
considered	 responsible	 for	 the	 LHI	 case,	
no	 longer	 occupied	 strategic	 positions.	
Anis	 Matta	 then	 founded	 the	 Indonesian	
New	 Direction	 Movement	 (Garbi),	 an	
organization	 to	 carry	 out	 his	 ideas	 that	
could	 not	 be	 implemented	 in	 the	 PKS.	 In	




conflicts	 retook	 place	 in	 PPP.	 There	 was	
friction	 between	 the	 general	 chairman,	
Suryadarma	Ali,	 and	 the	 party	 secretary-
general,	Romahurmuzy.	Suryadarma	Ali's	
unilateral	 action	 to	 support	 Prabowo	 for	
the	 2014	 presidential	 election	 triggered	
the	conflict	between	them.	Meanwhile,	the	
party	has	not	yet	produced	an	agreement	






led	 by	 Romahurmuzy	 and	 the	 Jakarta	





was	 inseparable	 from	 the	 political	
constellation	 of	 the	 presidential	 race,	
marked	by	the	rise	of	conservative	Islam	in	
opposition	 to	 the	 Jokowi-Kalla	
government.	 In	 2016	 and	 2017,	 some	
PBB's	 politicians	 sympathized	 with	 or	
joined	 the	 212	 Islamic	 Defending	 Action	
(ABI)	movement,	 including	 the	Chairman	
of	the	Shura	Council,	MS	Kaban.	They	then	
supported	 ijtima	 ulama	 in	 determining	
support	 for	 presidential	 candidates	 in	
2019,	 where	 the	 move	 was	 a	 sort	 of	






support	 for	 Prabowo	 (Cnnindonesia.com,	
2019).	However,	Yusril	Ihza	Mahendra	as	
the	party’s	general	chairman,	decided	that	
PBB	 should	 join	 the	 Jokowi-Ma'ruf	
coalition	 (Anugrahadi,	 2019).	 Yusril's	
political	 move	 disappointed	 other	 party	
elites	 who	 opposed	 the	 Jokowi‘s	
government,	 and	 they	 eventually	 left	 the	
party.		
Internal	conflicts	due	to	differences	
in	 political	 support	 in	 facing	 the	 2019	
elections	 were	 also	 experienced	 by	 PAN.	
Amien	Rais,	who	was	critical	of	the	Jokowi	
government	 from	the	start,	 tried	to	bring	
party	 support	 to	 Prabowo-Sandi	 in	 the	
2019	 presidential	 election.	 Meanwhile,	
other	 party	 officials,	 including	 Zulkifli	
Hasan,	 tended	 to	 bring	 PAN	 to	 the	
government	 and	 become	 part	 of	 the	
Jokowi-Amin	 coalition.	 The	 internal	
friction	 eventually	 formed	 two	 camps,	
namely	 the	 Amien	 Rais	 camp	 and	 the	
Zulkifli	camp,	which	resulted	in	the	party's	
split	after	the	2019	election.	
From	 the	 description	 above,	
generally,	 the	 intra-party	 conflicts	 of	
Islamic-based	parties	are	triggered	by	the	
formation	 of	 interest-based	 elites	 circles	
that	fighting	for	party	authority.	The	intra-
party	 conflicts	 also	 related	 to	 the	
governmental	 politics	 for	 some	 parties,	
such	as	in	the	PKB,	which	was	affected	by	
the	 political	 constellation	 in	 2001	 and	
2004,	 PPP	 in	 2014,	 and	 PAN	 and	 PBB	 in	
2019.	Nevertheless,	it	should	be	noted	that	
intra-party	 conflicts	 happen	 not	 only	 to	
Islamic-based	 parties	 but	 also	 to	 other	
parties,	 such	 as	 Golkar	 Party	 (2014),	
Hanura	Party	(2019),	and	Berkarya	Party	
(2019).	 This	 means	 that	 the	 intra-party	
conflict	 stems	 from	 the	problem	of	 party	
institutionalization,	 where	 organizational	
management	 is	 unable	 to	 overcome	
competition	 among	 its	 elites.	 In	 this	
discussion,	 the	conflicts	between	Islamic-








Conflicts	 and	 Fragmentation	 on	 the	




April	 29,	 2021,	 with	 General	 Chairman	
Ridho	 Rahmadi	 and	 the	 position	 of	
Secretary-General	held	by	Ahmad	Muhajir	
Sodruddin.	 Its	 founder	 is	 Amien	 Rais,	
former	 Chairman	 of	 the	 PAN	 Board	 of	
Trustees.	 The	 Amien	 Rais	 exit	 from	 PAN	
was	preceded	by	a	prolonged	friction	with	
Zulkifli	 Hasan,	 the	 General	 Chair	 of	 PAN.	
The	quarrel	 between	 the	 two	party’s	 top	
leaders	 was	 triggered	 by	 discrepancy	 in	
responding	 the	 Jokowi’s	 government,	
whereas	 Amien	 constantly	 criticized	 the	
government,	Zulkifli	tend	to	conform.	Just	
after	 the	 2014	 election,	 PAN	 made	 a	
tactical	move	 by	 employing	 the	 two	 side	
strategy.	 In	 the	 opposition	 side,	 their	
maneuver	 at	 KMP	 had	 succeeded	 in	
placing	Zulkifli	Hasan	as	the	leader	of	the	
MPR.	 The	 party	 then	 joined	 the	
government	 in	 2016,	which	 obtained	 the	
minister's	 seat	 for	 Bureaucratic	 Reform	
State	Apparatus	Empowerment	(PAN-RB)	
filled	with	Asnan	Abnur.		
Despite	 being	 part	 of	 the	 ruling	
government,	PAN	was	often	at	odds	with	
the	government,	as	in	the	Election	Bill	and	
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the	 Civil	 Organization	 Bill	 in	 2017	
(Setyawan,	 2018).	 Amien	 Rais	 also	
continued	to	criticize	the	government.	He	
built	 proximity	 to	 the	 opposition	parties,	
Gerindra	 Party	 and	 PKS,	 preparing	 to	
challenge	 the	 incumbent	 Jokowi	 in	 the	
2019	election.	Amien	Rais	even	played	as	
one	 of	 the	 central	 figures	 in	 various	
protests	 against	 the	 government,	 for	
example,	 at	 the	 212	 Defending	 Islam	
Action.	Ahead	of	 the	2019	election,	Amin	
dragged	 PAN	 closer	 to	 the	 opposition	
forces.	He	stated	that	the	constituents	did	






The	 friction	 between	 Zulkifli	 and	




Jokowi-Amin	 camp.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
Amies	Rais	has	far	built	a	perception	at	the	
grassroots	 that	 PAN	 was	 part	 of	 the	
coalition	 that	 supports	 Prabowo.	 In	 the	
ranks	 of	 the	 central	 party	 board,	 the	
majority	have	agreed	that	the	party	would	
join	 the	 Jokowi-Amin	 coalition.	However,	
Amien	 Rais	 as	 Chairman	 of	 the	 party's	
Board	 of	 Trustees	 later	 'canceled'	 the	








Amin	 Rais	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	
management	structure	in	the	party	board	
for	 the	 2020-2025	 period	 (Prabowo,	
2020).	 Before	 the	 congress	 took	 place,	
divisions	 had	 already	 appear	 in	 which	
many	 cadres	 of	 regional	 administrators	
(regional	 and	 branch	 leaders),	 known	 to	
be	 Amin	 Rais	 loyalists,	 were	 replaced.	
Amin’s	 supporters	 believed	 that	 if	 the	
congress	was	fair,	they	would	undoubtedly	
win.	 However,	 they	 suspected	 the	
government	 intervention	was	present,	 so	





Zulkifli	 Hasan	 had	 the	 government	
support.	 Loyalist	 Amin	 Rais	 also	 did	 not	
accept	 the	 Zulkifli	 legitimacy.	 They	
insisted	 that	 Amin	 Rais	 should	 be	 in	 the	
party	 board.	 Because	 his	 demands	 were	






PAN	 and	 chairman	 of	 the	 PAN	 faction	 in	
the	DPR,	 decided	 to	 resign.	 Interestingly,	
Hanafi	Rais'	decision	was	regretted	by	his	
younger	 brother	 who	 also	 serves	 as	 the	
administrator	of	the	PAN,	Mumtaz	Rais.	In	
the	 conflict	 between	 Zulkifli	 and	 Amin	
Rais,	 Mumtaz	 Rais	 was	 in	 Zulkifli’s	 side.	
This	 may	 be	 related	 to	 a	 personal	
relationship,	 where	 Zulkifli	 is	 the	 father-
in-law	 of	 Mumtaz	 Rais.	 Because	 Mumtaz	
supported	Zulkifli,	he	ended	up	in	a	family	
conflict	 with	 Amin	 Rais	 (Akbar,	 2020a).	
The	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	 camps	 can	
also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 'family'	 conflict	 and	
indicates	 the	 PAN’s	 party	
institutionalization	 as	 somewhat	
problematic.		









the	 congress's	 results	 (Akbar,	 2020b).	




is	 due	 to	 his	 belief	 that	 the	 current	 state	
has	 been	 controlled	 by	 oligarchic	 forces,	
which	have	caused	political	and	economic	
sovereignty	 to	have	 shifted	entirely	 from	
the	 people	 to	 the	 capitalists	 (Aritonang,	
2021).	 In	 August	 2021,	 supporters	 of	
Amien	 Rais	 with	 his	 figurehead	 Agung	
Mozin	urged	the	formation	of	a	new	party.	
On	 October	 1,	 2020,	 Amien	 Rais	
announced	 that	his	new	party	would	use	
the	 name	Ummah	 Party	 and	 at	 the	 same	
time,	PAN	stated	that	Amien	Rais	was	no	
longer	 their	 cadre.	 Amien	 Rais	 then	
declared	the	establishment	of	the	Ummah	
Party	on	April	29,	2021.	 In	 its	 leadership	
structure,	Amien	Rais	served	as	Chairman	
of	the	Syuro	Council,	General	Chairperson	
Ridho	 Rahmadi,	 and	 Secretary-General	
Ahmad	 Muhajir	 Sodruddin	 (Aditya,	
2021b).		
Apart	 from	 being	 motivated	 by	
conflicts	 between	 elites	 in	 PAN,	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 Ummah	 Party	 was	
driven	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 public	
disillusionment	with	the	political	order	in	
the	 Jokowi	 era.	However,	 in	 general,	 this	
party	criticized	the	whole	political	power	
system	 by	 the	 oligarchs,	 where	 both	 the	
executive	and	the	legislature	are	colluded	
and	 abandoned	 people's	 interests.	
Therefore,	 the	 narrative	 carried	 by	 the	
Ummah	Party	is	related	to	continuing	the	
struggle	of	the	Amien	Rais	camp	in	PAN	in	
fighting	 against	 injustice,	 where	 the	
antagonist	 is	 pinned	 to	 the	 Jokowi‘s	
government	(Saputro,	2021).		
The	 resistance	 narrative,	 which	 is	
also	 ideologically	 nuanced,	 with	
perceptions	 of	 injustice	 and	 tyranny,	
indicates	 that	 the	 Ummah	 Party	 uses	 a	
populist	 strategy.	 The	 populist	 strategy	
implemented	 by	 the	 Ummah	 Party	 is	 a	
compulsion	 because	 the	 party	 was	 born	
out	 of	 discontent	 with	 the	 Jokowi’s	
government	 but	 was	 not	 accommodated	
by	the	previous	party,	PAN.	This	strategy	
is	also	plausible	because	the	Ummah	Party	





stance	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 Jokowi’s	
government.	 Specifiying	 Islam	 as	 party’s	
ideology	and	 the	 fact	 that	since	 the	2014	
election	 most	 Muhammadiyah	 followers	












times,	 including	 PAN,	 PPP,	 and	 PBB.	 The	
general	 vice	 chairmen	 are	 Zulkifli	 Ali,	
Ahmad	Heri,	Alfian	Tanjung,	Abdul	Khoir,	
and	 Ahmad	 Murjoko.	 Meanwhile,	 the	
party's	 Syuro	 Council	 chairman	 is	
Abdullah	 Hehamahua	 (a	 former	 KPK	
adviser)	 with	 members	 Ahmad	 Cholil	
Ridwan,	Abdul	Manan,	Adnin	Arnas,	Abbas	
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government	 with	 accusations	 of	 the	 PKI.	
As	the	name	implies,	the	Masyumi-Reborn	
Party	 aspires	 to	 restore	 the	 glory	 of	 the	
Masyumi	 Party,	 which	 once	 took	 part	 in	
the	 1955	 elections.	 At	 that	 time,	 the	
Masyumi	Party	was	 in	 second	place	with	
57	 seats	 after	 the	 PNI.	 Their	 primary	
aspiration	 is	 almost	 similar	 to	 the	




only	 in	 historical	 and	 ideological	
romanticism	 but	 also	 in	 characters.	
Several	figures	have	previously	worked	at	
the	 PBB,	 including	 Ahmad	 Yani,	 Abbas	
Thaha,	 Masri	 Sitanggang,	 and	 Sahar	 El	
Hasan.	This	means	that	there	are	signs	of	
ongoing	 internal	 divisions	 at	 the	 PBB,	
which	have	caused	some	of	 its	 leaders	 to	
leave	 and	 establish	 new	 parties.	 There	
were	 differences	 in	 political	 direction	 at	
the	 PBB	 around	 the	 2019	 presidential	
election,	where	the	Chair	of	the	PBB	Syuro	
Council	 recommended	parties	 to	 support	
Prabowo-Sandi	 (Antara,	 2019).	
Meanwhile,	 Yusril	 Izha	 Mahendra	 sided	
with	Jokowi-Amin	and	became	the	head	of	
the	 candidate	 legal	 team.	 After	 the	 2019	
presidential	election,	the	PBB	under	Yusril	
decided	 to	 continue	 supporting	 the	
Jokowi-Amin	 government	 until	 2024	
(Hakim,	 2019).	 The	 PBB	 Secretary-
General,	 Afriansyah	 Ferry	 Noor,	
acknowledged	 that	 their	 internal	 friction	
during	the	2019	presidential	election	was	
due	 to	 some	 cadres	 that	 had	 been	 at	
clashed	 with	 Yusril	 Izha	 Mahendra	 and	
were	 therefore	not	accommodated	 in	 the	
party	 board	 for	 the	 2020	 period	
(Andayani,	 2020).	 However,	 not	 all	
disillusioned	 figures	 at	 the	 PBB	 have	
founded	 or	 joined	 the	 Masyumi-Reborn	
Party.	MS	Kaban,	who	once	held	the	Chair	
of	the	PBB	Shura	Council,	chose	to	join	the	




who	 opposed	 the	 Jokowi’s	 government.	
Ahmad	Yani,	a	former	PBB	politician	who	
later	 became	 chairman	 of	 the	 Masyumi-
Reborn	Party,	once	joined	the	Indonesian	
Rescue	 Action	 Coalition	 (KAMI),	 a	 forum	
or	organization	that	actively	criticizes	the	
Jokowi’s	 government.	 They	 consisted	 of	
opposition	 figures	 such	 as	 Gatot	
Nurmantyo,	 Hidayat	 Nur	 Wahid,	 Amien	
Rais,	 and	 Rocky	 Gerung.	 Although	 it	 has	
nothing	to	do	with	KAMI,	the	involvement	
of	 several	 figures	 from	 the	 Masyumi-
Reborn	 Party	 in	 it	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 a	
shading	 of	 the	 struggling	 spirit	 that	 puts	




narrative	 of	 the	 Masyumi-Reborn	 Party	
can	be	seen	in	its	vision	that	puts	forward	
an	 orientation	 to	 fix	 politics,	 which,	
according	 to	 them,	 is	 far	 from	 Pancasila	
values.	 They	 highlight	 the	 political	
processes	 under	 the	 Jokowi	
administration,	 which	 are	 far	 from	





religious	 values	 in	 education.	
Furthermore,	the	Masyumi	-Reborn	Party	
initiated	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Islamic	






Faction	 as	 happened	 in	 1955	 and	 1994	
(Detiknews,	 2021).	 Therefore,	 they	 claim	
they	 do	 not	 want	 to	 compete	 with	 the	
existing	 Islamic	 parties	 but	 rather	 target	
Islamic	voters	who	have	not	voted	for	an	
Islamic	 party.	 They	 saw	 a	 significant	
potency	 of	 the	 Islamic	 voter	 in	 the	 low	
voter	 turnout	 for	 Islamic	 parties	 in	 the	
2019	 election,	 which	 was	 only	 around	
30%	(Alfons,	2021).	
The	 presence	 of	 politicians	 who	
have	been	critical	of	 the	government	and	
the	 background	 of	 disappointment	 with	
the	 previous	 party,	 which	 did	 not	
accommodate	oppositional	stances,	made	
the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Masyumi-Reborn	
Party	not	much	different	from	the	Ummah	
Party.	The	two	parties	also	contain	many	
similarities	 in	 terms	 of	 ideological	 views	






PBB.	 The	 political	 account	 that	 is	 put	




party	 elites,	 and	 it	 intensified	 due	 to	




The	 Gelora	 Party	 was	 founded	 on	
October	28,	2019,	with	general	 chairman	
Anis	 Matta,	 Deputy	 General	 Chairman	
Fahri	 Hamzah,	 and	 secretary-general	
Mahfuz	 Sidiq.	 The	 party	 platform	
promoted	 by	 this	 party	 is	 different	 from	
the	 Ummah	 Party	 and	 the	 Masyumi-
Reborn	Party,	where	the	Gelora	Party	has	
a	more	open,	nationalist	 ideological	view	
but	 does	 not	 contradict	 the	 Islamic	
ideology	 and	 nationalist.	 They	 offer	











However,	 the	 internal	 conflict	
between	the	Anis	Matta	camp	and	the	PKS	
board	has	not	subsided	since	the	2015	PKS	
national	 meeting.	 The	 conflict	 escalated,	
and	Anis	Matta's	group	eventually	left	PKS	
and	 founded	 the	 Gelora	 Party	 (Umam,	
2020).	 The	 internal	 conflict	 in	 PKS	 had	
been	going	on	for	a	long	time	before	Anis	
Matta's	group	decided	 to	 leave	 the	party.	
The	conflict	is	related	to	the	feud	between	
the	two	camps,	representing	contradictory	
views,	 namely	 the	 conservative	 and	
progressive,	 also	 known	 as	 the	 justice	
faction	 and	 the	 prosperous	 faction.	 The	
conservative	 camp	 consists	 of	 seniors	 in	
PKS	who	occupy	the	Syuro	Council,	while	
the	prosperous,	progressive	camp	consists	
of	 young	 cadres	who	 have	 a	 direction	 of	
renewal.	 They	 were	 driven	 by,	 among	
others,	 Anis	 Matta,	 Mahfudz	 Shidiq,	 and	
Fahri	Hamzah	(Herdiansah,	2016).		
If	 traced,	 internal	 conflicts	 in	 PKS	
have	 emerged	 after	 the	 2004	 elections.	
The	 trigger	 is	 the	 visional	 difference	
among	 the	 inner	 elites.	 In	2009,	 frictions	
about	 Anis	 Matta's	 group	 intensified	
because	 of	 his	 statements	 about	 an	 open	
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and	 a	 middle	 way	 party	 orientation.	 In	
2013,	 the	 LHI	 arrest	 made	 Anis	 Matta	 a	
PKS	 caretaker.	 However,	 since	 the	 case,	
Anis	 Matta	 has	 been	 under	 the	 spotlight	
because	 he	 is	 considered	 responsible	 for	
tarnishing	 the	party's	 image.	At	 the	2015	
PKS	 National	 Conference,	 Hilmy	
Aminudin's	 position	 as	 Chairman	 of	 the	
Syuro	Council	was	replaced	by	Salim	Segaf,	
and	 Mohamad	 Sohibul	 Iman	 held	 the	
party's	 president.	 Since	 the	 change	 in	




of	 deputy	 chairman	 of	 the	 DPR	 to	 be	
replaced	by	Ledia	Hanifa.	However,	Fahri	
disobeyed	 and	 took	 the	 case	 to	 court.	 At	
the	 same	 time,	 the	 term	 orang	 sini	 (the	
ingroup,	osin)	emerged	as	the	ruling	camp,	
which	means	those	who	submit	to	Sohibul	





According	 to	 Mahfudz	 Shidiq,	 the	
conflict	 occurred	 due	 to	 contradicting	
views	 that	 could	 not	 be	 compromised	
anymore.	The	conservative	camp	insisted	




obedience	 in	 the	 party	 was	 everything.	
According	to	Anis	Matta's	camp,	this	kind	
of	 doctrine	 hinders	 the	 political	
achievements	 of	 both	 the	 party	 and	 its	
cadres.	 For	 example,	 Mardani	 Ali	 Sera	
initially	 wanted	 to	 be	 nominated	 for	
deputy	governor	of	DKI	in	2017	but	failed	
after	 the	 Shura	 Council	 did	 not	 give	 his	
blessing	(al	Faqir	&	Kadafi,	2019).	Another	
objection	 from	 Anis	 Matta's	 camp	 is	 the	
closed	management	of	the	party,	including	
how	decisions	are	made.	Since	the	conflict	
escalated,	 the	 PKS	 board,	 after	 the	 2015	
National	 Conference,	 fired	 cadres	 who	
were	deemed	to	be	against	or	close	to	Anis	
Matta.	 For	 example,	 in	 Situbondo,	 the	
chairman	 of	 the	 party	 region	 who	 was	
fired	 for	 refusing	 to	 sign	 a	 resignation	
letter	with	a	blank	date	(Erwati,	2018).		
From	 that	 series	 of	 events,	 Anis	
Matta	 began	 to	 think	 about	 reforms	 and	
initiated	 a	 New	 Direction	 for	 Indonesia.	
The	idea	was	welcomed	by	former	cadres,	
which	 the	 party	 dismissed.	 Anis	 Matta	
carried	 out	 an	 aggressive	 political	
campaign	 by	 spreading	 billboards	 in	
regions	 with	 the	 slogan	 "Arah	 Baru	
Indonesia"	 (ABI).	The	PKS	 leadership	did	
not	 like	 anis	 Matta's	 political	 movement	
and	his	ABI	idea	(Putri,	2018).	Anis	Matta	
is	considered	presumptuous	to	carry	out	a	
political	 safari	 and	 strongly	 emphasizes	
that	 he	 wants	 to	 run	 as	 a	 presidential	
candidate	 for	 2019,	 even	 without	 the	
party's	permission.	In	fact,	PKS	already	has	
its	mechanism	in	determining	who	will	be	
campaigned	 as	 a	 presidential	 candidate	




Because	 it	was	 no	 longer	 possible	
to	 realize	 the	 idea	of	an	open	party,	Anis	
Matta	and	his	group	left	PKS	and	founded	
the	 Gelora	 Party.	 Although	 many	 cadres	
regretted	 the	 split,	 the	 movement	 was	
very	 well	 accepted	 by	 Anis	 Matta's	
followers.	Anis	Matta	has	more	freedom	to	
realize	 his	 vision	 of	 a	 party	 that	
emphasizes	 openness	 and	 freedom	 of	
thought	 by	 establishing	 a	 new	 party.	
However,	 the	 idea	 of	 eliminating	 the	








Islamic	 vision.	 They	 often	 express	 the	
concept	 of	 post-Islamism	 and	 refer	 to	
Turkey's	 Erdogan	 as	 a	 political	 path	 that	
can	 solve	 the	 nation's	 problems.	
Internally,	 Anis	 Matta	 wants	 to	 build	 an	
organizational	 culture	 that	 allows	
criticism	 for	 improvement.	 The	 party's	
platform	is	promoting	the	spirit	to	stop	the	
dichotomy	 between	 Islam-based	 parties	
and	nationalist	parties	and	combine	them	
with	the	Pancasila	principle.	Even	though	
Fahri	Hamzah	 rejects	 the	notion	 that	 the	
Gelora	 Party	 is	 religious,	 their	 Islamic	
narrative	remains	strong.	For	example,	in	
its	 last	 paragraph,	 the	 party's	 manifesto	
states,	 "By	 putting	 your	 trust	 in	 Allah..."	
(Partai	Gelora,	2019).	
The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Gelora	
Party,	 thus,	 was	 the	 implementation	 of	
political	ideas	among	the	PKS	progressive	
camp	that	did	not	have	a	place	in	the	party.	
This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 Gherghina,	 Close,	 &	
Kopecký	 (2019)	 about	 the	 cadre's	
dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 party	 platform.	




the	 founding	 of	 the	 Gelora	 Party	 was	
driven	 by	 fragmentation	 within	 the	 PKS	
due	 to	 two	 things.	 First,	 differences	 in	
ideological	 views	 or	 party	 orientations	
eventually	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 post-Islamist	
narrative	 in	 the	 Gelora	 Party	 as	 a	
contradiction	to	the	Islamist	party	pinned	
on	 PKS.	 Second,	 the	 contest	 of	 interests	
among	 the	 elites,	 which	 the	 progressive	
camp	 failed	 to	 realize	 their	 ideas	 as	 they	














Ideological	division	 Yes	 but	 not	
prominent	
No	 Yes	

















This	 article	 concludes	 that	 two	
factors	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	
Islamic	 parties	 after	 the	 2019	 general	
election.	 First,	 borrowing	 from	 the	 path-
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platforms,	and	strategies	in	responding	to	
political	 developments	 and	 power	
contestation	 among	 the	 party’s	 elites.	
Second,	 the	 factor	 of	 political	 turbulence	
that	rocked	Islamic	parties	in	2014-2019.	
The	 ongoing	 political	 polarization	 in	 this	
period	 has	 increased	 identity-based	
awareness	 in	 the	 Islamic	 voter	 base,	
impacting	 demands	 for	 parties	 to	
accommodate	 both	 aspects	 of	 the	 values	




motivated	 to	 fight	 for	 the	 interests	 and	
values	of	the	voter	base	that	are	not	or	are	
not	 accommodated	 by	 the	 party.	
Interestingly,	the	political	turbulence	that	
also	 rocked	 the	 PPP	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 parties.	 This	 issue	 is	
interesting	 to	 be	 studied	 in	 future	
research.	
The	 emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic-
based	parties	after	 the	2019	election	still	
has	a	similar	pattern	as	conflicts	that	have	
occurred	 before,	 as	 revealed	 by	 Mashad	
(2008).	 Internal	party	conflicts	 in	 Islamic	
parties	are	also	in	line	with	differences	in	
policy	 preferences,	 both	 internal	 to	 the	
party	and	the	government	(Ceron,	2016),	
as	shown	by	the	Ummah	Party	(PAN)	and	
the	 Masyumi-Reborn	 Party	 (PBB).	
However,	 in	 the	 post-election	 period	 of	
2019,	 the	 establishment	 of	 Islamic-based	
parties	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	 political	
turbulence	 from	 the	 presidential	 contest,	
which	ignited	polarization.	This	condition	
had	an	impact	significantly	on	the	Ummah	
Party	 and	 the	 Masjumi-Reborn	 Party.	
Meanwhile,	the	Gelora	Party	is	not	carried	
away	 by	 the	 current	 polarization	 in	 the	
sense	 of	 siding	 with	 one	 of	 the	 camps,	
whether	pro	Jokowi	or	in	opposition.	They	
try	to	offer	the	idea	of	a	middle	ground	by	
combining	 Islamic	 and	 nationalist	 views.	
Such	statements	are	not	new	in	Indonesian	
political	 landscape.	 The	 Democrat	 Party,	
for	 example,	 also	 carries	 a	 nationalist-
religious	orientation	as	an	accommodative	
idea	of	the	dualism	of	political	views	that	
have	 been	 built	 on	 the	 socio-political	
history	in	Indonesia,	Islam	vs.	nationalist.		
The	 arguments	 brought	 by	 the	
Gelora	 Party	 tend	 to	 reflect	 anti-thesis	
attitudes	 and	 thoughts	 towards	 the	
construction	of	the	PKS	political	ideology.		
However,	 the	polarized	political	situation	
has	 somewhat	 inflicted	 the	 Gelora	 Party	
establishment.	They	offer	an	alternative	to	
a	 segment	 of	 the	 electorate	 who	 is	
hindered	by	 the	dichotomy	between	pro-
government,	nationalist,	secularist	on	the	
one	 hand,	 and	 anti-regime	 government,	
Islamist,	 and	 religious	 on	 the	 other.	
Meanwhile,	 the	 Ummah	 Party	 and	 the	
Masyumi-Reborn	 Party	 positioned	
themselves	 as	 opposition	 forces	 for	 the	
government	 regime.	 In	 fact,	 the	 conflict	
behind	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 two	
parties	 was	 driven	 by	 differences	 in	 its	
faction’s	 stance	 towards	 the	 Jokowi	
government.	 The	 Ummah	 Party	 and	 the	
Masyumi-Reborn	 Party	 are	 trying	 to	
attract	voters	who	are	dissatisfied	with	the	
performance	 of	 the	 Jokowi	 government.	
The	 founders	 or	 administrators	 of	 the	
Ummah	Party	and	Masyumi-Reborn	Party	
are	 adamant	 in	 the	 opposition	 and	
consider	their	actions	as	a	nation	and	state	
while	 also	 reflecting	 negative	 aspects	 of	
the	 Jokowi	 government.	 The	 inclusion	 of	
Islamic	symbols	in	the	party	also	indicates	
targeting	 the	 Muslim	 segment	 of	 voters	
who	feel	under-represented	by	PKS,	PBB,	
and	PAN.	






The	 emergence	 of	 new	 Islamic-
based	 parties	 after	 2019	 still	 shows	 the	
problem	 of	 weak	 party	
institutionalization,	 as	 revealed	 by	 Tan	
(2006)	and	Ufen	(2008).	The	problematic	
of	party	institutionalization	is	also	marked	
by	 the	 fragility	 of	 solidarity	 and	
commitment	to	the	party's	struggle	simply	
because	 of	 its	 elites	 power	 contestation	
and	differences	 in	responding	 to	political	




a	 strategic	 struggle	 to	 achieve	 long-term	
goals.	The	 Islamic-based	party	politicians	
also	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 party	 as	 a	 personal	




party	 and	 establish	 a	 new	 one.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 ruling	 party	 faction	 also	
tends	 to	 eliminate	 opposing	 side	 to	





sociology	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 Political	
Science,	Universitas	Padjadjaran.	His	field	
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